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We use an inﬁnitely lived agent model in which an intermediate good is provided either
by a public or a private monopolist to study the eﬀects of privatization on steady state
levels of income. We allow for public sector ineﬃciencies(x-ineﬃciency) which shift down
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d st e c h n o l o g ya sw e l la sb u r e a u c r a t i ci n e ﬃciencies which decrease the
amount of tax revenue which will actually be allocated to public investment. We solve
the model numerically for reasonable parameter values. The results of the model indicate
that the beneﬁts of this type of privatizations depend crucially on the size of the relative
ineﬃciency of public ﬁrms and the amount of public investment. Furthermore, the gains from
privatization are found to be strongly related to the balance sheet of the public ﬁrm that
is privatized. Privatization of public ﬁrms which run deﬁcits (surpluses) typically generate
increases (decreases) in steady state consumption.1 Introduction
During the 1980s and the 1990s large scale privatizations of state owned enterprises (SOEs)
took place throughout the world as governments attempted to reform their economic struc-
ture. In many instances, these privatization eﬀorts focused on intermediate industries like
electricity, telecommunications, oil, and others (See the World Bank’s Bureaucrats in Busi-
ness Report (1995)).
The divestiture of state monopolies from such industries is perhaps the most debated
type of privatization. Even in developing regions, where large privatization processes have
taken place, opinions are divided regarding these policies. On the one hand, privatization
advocates argue that private ﬁrms bring along a gain in productive eﬃciency and that
privatizations can free up public resources to be put to more beneﬁcial uses. On the other
hand, privatization opponents claim that private monopolies would cut production below a
socially desired level. They also question the existence of any eﬃciency gains.
Much of the interest in privatization rests on the empirical evidence concerning the eﬃ-
ciency of private enterprises relative to public ﬁrms. Most theoretical and empirical investiga-
tions about privatization, however, concentrate their analysis on cases in which competition is
introduced at roughly the same time of divestiture (see Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003)).
Only a few studies refer to the eﬀects of the privatizations of state monopolies where the
ownership and productive incentives change but market competition is not introduced.
Authors like LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) and Bourbakri and Cosset (1998), for
1example, study the eﬃciency gains that take place after privatizations of both competitive
and non-competitive industries. Both of them report relatively small gains for the case of
privatization of non-competitive industries. Others like Vickers and Yarrow (1991) report no
eﬃciency advantages for either private or public ownership under non-competitive conditions.
Regardless of their ﬁndings on the productive ineﬃciencies in SOEs (if any), all these
studies exclude a list of important elements (that are likely to alter the economic eﬀects of
privatizations) from the analysis. Examples of such elements include the ﬂow of resources
from the government to the SOE that is privatized, the diﬀerent constraints that public
and private ﬁrms face when making investment decisions, the inﬂuence that the SOE in
question has on other productive sectors of the economy, the welfare implications associated
with privatizations, and others. Macroeconomic studies are better suited for these type of
questions, but macroeconomic studies on these issues are rare.
Apart from the literature on privatization in the context of the post-Soviet reforms in
Eastern Europe, which includes for example Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Alexeev and
Kaganovich (2001), Blanchard (1997), Castanheira and Roland (2000) and Roland (2000), we
are not aware of many other theoretical papers on privatization in mixed market economies.
This post-Soviet privatization literature, however, does not look at the privatizations of
intermediate sectors, but rather at a whole-scale privatization of (almost) all productive
activity.
In this paper, we study the privatization of state monopolies found in intermediate in-
dustries. Using a theoretical model of an aggregate economy, we restrict our attention to
2the case where the monopolistic structure is preserved in the process of privatization. We
consider the presence of productive ineﬃciencies within the state monopolies as well as the
impact of other bureaucratic ineﬃciencies. Additionally, we consider the eﬀects of publicly
ﬁnanced deﬁcits or surpluses within these SOEs.
The following section presents a macroeconomic model with two productive sectors: a
competitive sector that produces ﬁnal goods, and a monopolistic sector that produces an
intermediate good. We use this model to simulate a shift from a public, ineﬃcient interme-
diate monopoly whose investment decisions are controlled by the government to a private
and eﬃcient intermediate monopoly whose investment decisions are guided by the proﬁt
maximizing eﬀorts of its owner. We refer to this shift as Privatization. We then use the
results of the model to analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of such privatizations in terms of
both steady state output and wealfare levels.
Using a similar theoretical model, Glomm and Mendez (2004) also study the economic
impact of privatizing a intermediate public monopoly. They study how the beneﬁts from
privatization vary from a competitive to a noncompetitive environment and how this dif-
ference changes as the elasticity of substitution for the intermediate good in the aggregate
production function changes. In contrast with this paper, they ignore any issues related to
ineﬃciencies, SOE’s deﬁcits, or the potential welfare impacts of privatization.
Two closely related papers are Schmitz (2001), who ﬁnds sizeable eﬀects of privatization
on aggregate income and Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (2001), who show that privatiza-
tion has large growth eﬀects. Schmitz does not consider the issue of monopoly power and
3Gylfason , Herbelson and Zoege model public and private goods as perfect substitutes in
consumption and do not focus on the role of government production in intermediate goods.
The next two sections of the paper present the theoretical framework of the model and
a description of the results. Finally, the last section of the paper oﬀers a summary of our
conclusions and a tentative list of issues pending for future research.
2 Theoretical Set-up
The economy is populated by a large number of individuals, which is normalized to one. The
individual lives forever and is endowed with k0 units of capital at time zero and with one unit
of labor in each period. At each point in time, he supplies labor and capital inelastically.
T h eb e f o r e - t a xw a g er a t ei swt. The before-tax rental price of capital is qt.









), (0 < β < 1, σ > 0),( 1 )
where β is a discount factor, ct represents consumption of ﬁnal goods at time t and 1/σ is
the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. Every period the individual divides his total
income between consumption at period t, ct and investment at period t, it. In addition, it
is assumed that capital depreciates at the rate δ regardless of the speciﬁcu s et ow h i c hi ti s
put.
Two goods are produced in this economy: a ﬁnal good Yt is used for consumption and an
intermediate good Et is used completely in the production of ﬁnal goods. In this sense, the
4role of Et is similar to the role of many intermediate goods like electricity, internet, telecom-
munications, gas, or general energy that are used in almost all production processes. For
simplicity, we assume that this intermediate good is not consumed directly by the individuals.
The ﬁnal good is produced competitively by a large number of ﬁrms that use the same
constant returns to scale technology, which is given by
Yt = A(θK
ρ






F,t .( 2 )
Here KF,t and NF,t represent the amount of capital and labor used in the production of ﬁnal
goods at time t respectively, A is a constant measuring total factor productivity and ρ and
α are constants that measure the degree of substitutability and the marginal products of the
factors in the production function.
Since the technology exhibits constant returns to scale, we can assume that there is one












F,t − qtKF,t − rtEt − wtNF,t, (3)
given qt, rt,a n dwt.
Here rt represents the price per unit of intermediate good E at time t,a n dt h eﬁrm takes
all prices as given.





I,t ,( 4 )
where KI,t and NI,t represent the total units of capital and labor used in the production of
intermediate goods at time t respectively, γ is a positive constant, and B is a number that
represents the productive eﬃciency of the ﬁrm.
The assumption about constant returns to scale in the intermediate industry allows as
to capture diﬀerent possibilities regarding the nature of competition in this market. One
possibility is that the monopolistic power was generated by laws that prevented an otherwise
competitive industry; in that case, the production function in (4) can be though as the rep-
resentative production technology . Another possibility is that the monopolistic condition
is the result of ﬁxed start-up costs to the ﬁrm; in that case, the production function in (4)
would need to include a ﬁxed cost as well. This last term, however, if suﬃciently small
would not inﬂuence any marginal decisions.
Using this basic framework, we construct two alternative models: one with a private
intermediate monopoly and another one with a public intermediate monopoly. The private
monopolist’s problem can then be written as
Max
{NI,KI}
r(Et) · Et − wtNI − qtKI,( 5 )





given r(Et), wt, qt.
6Here the inverse demand function r(Et) corresponds to the representative ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s
input demand function resulting from its maximization problem as stated by (3) and the
constant B is set to one to indicate full eﬃciency in the private sector.
If B<1 (B>1), the public sector monopoly is less (more) eﬃcient than the private
sector monopoly. The lower productive eﬃciency of public ﬁrms (often referred to as X-
ineﬃciency) can be explained by the lack of managerial incentives, the mix of political
interests into the objective function, the lack of clear monitoring eﬀorts by the government,
and others (See for example Kay and Thompson (1986), Vickers and Yarrow (1991), Plane
(1992)). Here any such sort of ineﬃciency is summarized by the constant B.
Any proﬁts generated by the public and the private monopolies are deﬁned by πg and
πp respectively. For the private monopoly case, we assume that proﬁts πp are distributed
equally among the individuals. For the public monopoly case, we assume that proﬁts πg are
collected by the government and used in the same way as any other type of revenue.
The government in these economies taxes labor and capital income at the common rate
τ; this tax rate is exogenous and assumed to be constant over time. The government has
only two types of expenditures: government transfers T and government investment.
Speciﬁcally, for the public monopoly case, we assume that a fraction Ψ of πg is used for
investments in the capital of the public ﬁrm. We allow for Ψ to be greater than one as long
as the government budget is balanced and the transfers T are not negative1.W e d o n o t
1This is equivalent to assume that a fraction of total government revenue is invested and the other fraction
used for Transfers. We choose to model public investment in this way because it facilitates the analysis of
SOE deﬁcits as opposed to ﬁscal deﬁcits.
7allow Ψ to be less than zero, since this would amount to selling the public capital (a form of
privatization).
Public investments are further subject to bureaucratic degradation; that is, for each unit
of funds allocated to investment only a fraction b of these funds is actually added to the
capital stock. The constant b is introduced to capture the eﬀects of corruption, red-tape,
and political inferences that are more likely to be present in public enterprises. Both b and
B are treated as exogenous variables. In principle, productive and bureaucratic ineﬃciency
are separate phenomena; interestingly, as will be shown afterwards, the eﬀects of changes
in b and B are not identical in our model.
The equation of motion of public capital and the government’s balanced budget condition
can then be described as follows:
KI,t =( 1− δ)KI,t−1 + b · Ψ · πg,t−1 ;( 6 )
τ(qtkt + wt)+πg,t = Ψπg,t + Tt. (7)
The assumption of a government balanced budget implies that public investment is ﬁ-
nanced entirely with current government revenues. Having a balanced government budget
constraint also allows us to isolate and study the eﬀect of SOE’s deﬁcits (surpluses) on the
economy. An SOE is said to have a deﬁcit if net revenues cannot cover operating expenses
plus investment. By this deﬁnition, the case of Ψ > 1 (Ψ < 1) corresponds to a deﬁcit (sur-
8plus) on the SOE balance and thus, to a reduction (increase) on the public funds available
for other purposes. Similarly, the case of Ψ =1corresponds to a balanced SOE budget.
Given equations 6 and 7, the public monopolist problem can be written as
Max
{NI}
r(Et) · Et − wtNI,( 8 )





given r(Et),KI,t, wt, qt, B.
The inverse demand function r(Et) i ne q u a t i o n( 8 )i se x a c t l yt h es a m ea sb e f o r ea n dt h e
ﬁrm takes net investment in public capital as exogenous.
While the objective function of public sector enterprises is by no means uncontrover-
sial, we assume that the public ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize proﬁts. Such an assumption
might not be too far away from actual behavior since, as pointed out by Ramamurty (1991),
accounting practices, executive management and performance measures for state-owned en-
terprises often resemble those of private ﬁrms. Additionally, this assumption provides a
convenient comparison to the case of a private monopoly, where proﬁt maximization is more
natural.



















and kt+1 = it +( 1− δ)kt
given Tt, πp,t, wt, qt, pt, τ,a n dk0.
Here pt represents the price of a unit of consumption at time t relative to a unit of
consumption at time t +1and πp,t =0for the public monopoly case.
Finally, in equilibrium the capital and labor markets must clear, that is to say, at all
t i m e si tm u s tb et r u et h a tNF,t + NI,t =1and that Kt = KF,t + KI,t;w h e r eKI,t enters the
equation only for the private monopoly case.
The corresponding equilibrium for these two alternative economies is deﬁned as a sequence
(ct, Kt, Et, Yt, qt, rt, wt, Tt, πp,t)∞
t=0, such that:
• the individuals solve their utility maximization problem as given by (9),
• the ﬁnal good ﬁrms solve their proﬁt maximization problem as given by (3),
• the intermediate monopolist solves his maximization problem as given by (5) and (??)
respectively
• the government budget is balanced in all periods, and
• all markets clear.
103 Solution of the models
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will focus on steady states and drop time subscripts
whenever possible without the risk of confusion. We chose a value of ρ that is arbitrarily close
to zero, such that the production function described by equation (2) can be approximated





F,t . There are three reasons
that support our choice for ρ. First, as reported in cross-country studies by Megginson et al.
(1994) and Boubarki and Cosset (1998), the levels of employment of the privatized industries
(absolute and relative to total employment) do not change much after privatization. In our
model, the only value of ρ that generates this result is zero.
Second, although the empirical evidence about the value of the parameter ρ at the in-
dustry level is mixed (authors like Prywes (1986), for example, ﬁnd values varying from -24
to 12 across diﬀerent US industries); empirical studies at the macroeconomic level often ﬁnd
values that are closer to zero. Kemfert (1998) and Chang (1994), for example, estimate ρ
to be -0.5 and -0.14 for Germany and Taiwan respectively.
Third, as shown by Glomm and Mendez (2004), when the value of ρ moves away from
zero the changes in the output diﬀerence of the public and private monopoly cases is very
small. Thus, we do not expect a big gain in understanding to arise from changes in the
value ρ.
With this in mind, after solving the consumer’s dynamic utility maximization problem
and the ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem we obtain the Euler equation for the
11consumer and the ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrm. These equilibrium conditions are stated


























































12In both cases, the equilibrium system of equations can be solved to obtain a closed form
solution for the steady state equilibrium 2 but the analytical comparison of the alternative
models does not allow us to reach deﬁnitive conclusions regarding the gains from priva-
tization. Whether the private monopoly economy outperforms the public monopoly one
depends on the value of the key parameters studied here; namely, B, b and Ψ.T h u s , i n
order to obtain tangible results, a numerical exercise was conducted.
3.1 Numerical Simulation
The values of the exogenous parameters for our base case simulations are shown in Table 1.
Setting A =1is simply a normalization. The values for the capital’s share of income and
the rate of time preference are standard (See Gollin (2002)), and the values of τ =0 .2 and
δ =0 .1 correspond to the government’s share of GDP in relative poor countries and capital
depreciation respectively.
2Closed form solutions of these systems of equations together with the solutions for the most relevant
variables in the model are available upon request
13Table 1. Base Case Parameters
Preference Parameters: β =0 .96
σ > 0





Intermediate Goods Technology Paramenters: B =0 .8
γ =0 .4
Government Parameters τ =0 .2
b =0 .7
Ψ =1 .05
The value for the parameter γ (the share of capital in the value of the intermediate
input) was chosen to match the empirical observations about the role of capital in the
production of several intermediate goods. In the case of Britain, for example, Bishop and
Thompson (1992) reported capital to constitute 40.2% of total inputs used in the production
of electricity, 44.4% in the production of gas, and 46.7% for the telecommunication industry.
Values of γ ∈ (0.3,0.5) were also used without much change in the results.
In turn, the parameter ϕ, which measures the income share of the intermediate good
E, was set to match the actual share of SOE’s output to GDP as reported by the World
Bank’s Bureaucrats in Business report (1995). Since before the 1990s it was common for
the government to control the production of intermediate goods like public utilities and
telecommunications, this is a logical approximation. The average estimate of this ratio for
developing economies, as reported in the World Bank’s Bureaucrats in Business (BB) report
14(1995) was close to 11% during the period 1978-1991. The value of ϕ that matches this
result after accounting for all ineﬃciencies is 0.15.
With respect to the value of B, our base case choice is inspired by several empirical
studies. Using a sample of 79 ﬁrms in over 21 developing countries, Boubakri and Cosset
(1998) estimate a 14% gain in the sales-eﬃciency3 of noncompetitive ﬁrms. In a similar
study Megginson et al (1994) reported a 3% gain for the same measure. Others like La Porta
and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999) report a cost per unit decrease of 34% in the noncompetitive
Mexican privatizations. All of these authors report much greater income-eﬃciency4 gains
for all privatizations, but do not report them for the noncompetitive sector only. We chose
av a l u eo fB =0 .8 as our base case, but analyze a wider range of values in what follows.
A similar approach is taken for the values of b and Ψ. Although some evidence about
the investment costs associated with slow, cumbersome or corrupt bureaucracies is available
(see for example Guash and Hahn (1998) or Brunetti et al. (1998) ), it is diﬃcult to pin
down an exact number for b. We then explore values of b between 0.5 and 0.9, which we
think cover must cases.
Finally, the parameter Ψ measures the ﬂow of resources from the central government
to the state owned enterprises. The actual value of these transfers varies greatly across
developing regions of the world. According to the Bureaucrats in Business report (1995)
the average ﬂow of resources from the central government to all SOE’s as a percentage of
3Sales eﬃciency is deﬁned as Real Sales/Employees
4Income-eﬃciency is deﬁned as Net Income/Employees
15GDP averaged 1.4% in Asia, -1.6% in Latin America and 0.7% for Africa. We use a base
case value of Ψ =1 .05 (resulting in a resource ﬂow of 1.3% of GDP) but use many other
values throughout the analysis.
Table 2 shows some facts about the importance and performance of SOEs in Africa, Asia
and Latin America as well as the corresponding numbers from the base case simulation of
our model for the public monopoly case. The statistics are derived from the World Bank’s
Bureaucrats in Business (1995) data set, which provides valuable information about the role
of SOEs in the economic activity of over 50 developing countries during the years 1978-1991.
Table 2 shows four statistics from this data set. These statistics are the ratio of total
SOEs economic product to total GDP (SOE/GDP), the ratio of SOE’s investment to total
GDP (INV/GDP), the share of SOE’s employment to total employment (EMP), the net
ﬂow of resources from the central government to all SOEs (FLOW), and total SOE Balance
before transfers (BAL)5.
Table 2. SOEs Performance
Asia Latin America Africa Base Model
SOE/ GDP 8.3% 9.6% 13.9% 9.9%
INV/GDP 5.8% 3.5% 5.5% 10%
EMP (%) 2.9% 2.6% 20.6% 2.4%
FLOW ( % GDP) 1.4% -1.6% 0.7% 1.3%
BAL (%GDP) -3.1% -0.5% -2.9% -2.6%
As shown in Table 2, our base case model is able to replicate the average statistics from
5BAL is deﬁned as total SOE revenues minus wages, factor rentals, depreciation and net capital expen-
ditures.
16the BB data set6. According to the data, Asia and Latin America exhibit several similarities,
while African countries showed a much higher values for the share of SOE employment and
production. Interestingly, Asia and Latin America have also followed very diﬀerent policies
regarding privatization resulting in very diﬀerent growth patterns. We will return to this
issue later in the paper.
The parameters B,ba n dΨ may represent some of the most important sources of vari-
ation in public policies and we will study the implications of such variation on the eﬀect of
privatization programs in the next section.
4R e s u l t s
In order to answer our initial questions regarding the role that productive ineﬃciencies,
bureaucratic ineﬃciencies and SOE’s deﬁcits (or surpluses) play in the privatization process,
we depart from our base case in diﬀerent ways. A natural starting point is to determine
whether a public monopoly system that suﬀers from a x-degree level of ineﬃciency can
match the production and welfare levels achieved by the private monopoly system.
Table 3 addresses this issue for many possible values of B. The second column of Table
3 shows the ratio of the total output generated by the public monopoly economy to the
one generated by the private monopoly one (Ypub/Ypriv). Similarly, the third column of
Table 3 shows the ratio of the steady state consumption levels for the two alternative models
(Cpub/Cpriv). We use consumption levels as a measure of welfare.
6If the data is restricted to pre-1985 years (before privatization policies became wide spread), the data
value for INV/GDP becomes approximately 7%; which is much closer to our base case of 10%.












Ypriv = Total Output in the private monopoly case
Ypub = Total Output in the public monopoly case
Cpub = Consumption under the public monopoly case
Cpriv = Consumption under the private monopoly case
The calculations shown in Table 3 are replicated in Tables 4 and 5 using diﬀerent levels of
bureaucratic ineﬃciency. In all graphs, the results from the base case scenario are outlined
(in tables 4 and 5 the only change from the base case is the change in b).
























Starting with Table 3, our results suggest that ineﬃciencies have a negative and signiﬁcant
impact on both the level of output and the level of welfare generated in the public monopoly
economy relative to the private monopoly case. Noticeably, however, our results suggest
that the public monopoly economy can generate higher output and welfare levels than the
private one even though it exhibits signiﬁcant productive ineﬃciencies. This result emerge
when the investments levels in the public monopoly exceed those of the private monopoly.
In fact, as shown in tables 3-5, as long as the productive eﬃciency of public ﬁrms re-
mained above 80% (B>0.8), the public monopoly economy generated higher income and
welfare levels than the private one. It is only when productive eﬃciency falls below 70%-80
% that the situation is reversed and the welfare gains from privatization become positive
(Cpub/Cpriv < 1).
T h eb u r e a u c r a t i ce ﬃciency parameter b was assumed to take a lower value in Table 4
(b=0.5) and a higher value in Table 5 (b=0.9). Higher levels of bureaucratic eﬃciency yielded
higher welfare levels in the public monopoly case and, thus, smaller gains from privatization
19for all levels of B. Changing the level of bureaucratic eﬃciency had a similar but less severe
impact than the one obtained by changing the productive eﬃciency parameter; in fact, our
results from Table 3 are almost unaltered in Tables 4 and 5.
So far, however, we have assumed a ﬁxed public investment parameter (Ψ). As a result,
lower levels of productive eﬃciency B generate lower levels of output in the public monopoly
relative to the private monopoly case. At this point then, a valid question is how would the
results obtained so far change if (instead) the public investment parameter (Ψ) was allowed
to change and the production level of the public monopoly economy was to match that one
of the private monopoly economy.
We address this question in Table 6, where the public investment parameter value (Ψ)
is forced to change until the output from the public monopoly economy matches that of
the private monopoly one identically. In Table 6, columns (2) and (3) show the amount of
public investment that is necessary in order for the public monopoly economy to match the
total output generated by the private monopoly system. Column (2) shows this amount as
a percentage of public monopoly proﬁts and Column (3) as a percentage of total government
revenues. Finally, Column (4) shows the ratio of the steady state consumption levels (public
to private) achieved under these circumstances.
20Table 6. Public Matches Private (b=0.7)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B Ψ Pinv/GR Cpub/Cpriv
0.2 . . .
0.3 1.2055 0.5322 0.7973
0.4 0.5873 0.2593 0.8983
0.5 0.3362 0.1484 0.9394
0.6 0.2131 0.0941 0.9595
0.7 0.1450 0.0640 0.9706
0.8 0.1038 0.0458 0.9773
0.9 0.0773 0.0341 0.9817
1 0.0594 0.0262 0.9846
Pinv =Public Investment GR =Government Revenue
Two conclusions are taken from Table 6. First, that even when both private and public
systems yield the same level of total output, the private monopoly generates higher welfare
levels. This is the result of the assumed ineﬃciencies in the public sector and the smaller
disposable income the agents have under the public system. Thus, if the public monopoly
case is to yield higher welfare levels than the private monopoly case, it must generate higher
output levels as well.
Second, the steady state income level for the public monopoly matches the private
monopoly one without much burden on public revenues even at considerable levels of bu-
reaucratic and productive ineﬃciency. Using a value of B =0 .4 (a low value by all empirical
measures), for example, the necessary amount of public investment does not surpass 26% of
total government revenues. For values of B<0.3, however, it is not possible for the public
monopoly to match the private monopoly’s performance. Using our more realistic base-case
value for B =0 .8, the amount of resources needed to match the performance of the private
monopoly is surprisingly low: approximately 5% of government revenues.
21Furthermore, the match in output is achieved without any pressure on the SOE’s budget;
in fact, only at levels of B<0.4 is it necessary for the SOE to ﬁnance its investment with
deﬁcits. As a result, one is tempted to think that the eﬀects of productive ineﬃciencies
could be easily overcomed with additional public investment and that higher levels of public
investment would be associated with lower gains from privatizations. As we show next, this
is not always the case.
Table 7 goes back to the base case paramenters and explores the impact of changing the
amount of public investment above and below the SOE’s balanced budget level of investment.
As shown in Table 7, although increasing public investment always increases output, such an
increase in output ultimately comes at the expense of lower transfers and lower consumption
levels.
Table 7. The Eﬀects of Public Investments (b=0.7, B=0.8)
Ψ Ypub/Ypriv Cpub/Cpriv Pinv/GR
0.1 0.9980 0.9745 0.0441
0.2 1.0650 1.0226 0.0883
0.4 1.1365 1.0541 0.1766
0.6 1.1806 1.0565 0.2649
0.8 1.2128 1.0458 0.3532
1 1.2385 1.0275 0.4415
1.2 1.2598 1.0041 0.5298
1.4 1.2782 0.9770 0.6180
1.6 1.2943 0.9471 0.7063
1.8 1.3086 0.9149 0.7946
The results from Table 7 also suggest that the gains of privatization processes of inter-
mediate monopolies are strongly related to the balance sheet of the public ﬁrm in question.
In Table 7, deﬁcits in the intermediate public monopoly ﬁrm equal to or greater than 20%
22of their proﬁts (levels of Ψ ≥ 1.2) always generate welfare levels below the ones generated
by a private intermediate monopoly. In other words, privatizations of deﬁcitary SOEs are
associated with welfare gains.
In contrast, privatizations of SOEs that generate surpluses yield welfare losses under most
scenarios considered in this paper. As long as the level of public investment is enough to
surpass the output level of an alternative private ﬁrm, public monopolies with surpluses yield
higher consumption levels than private monopolies. In Table 7, this diﬀerence is maximized
for Ψ =0 .6.
The results from Table 7 were recalculated for a case of lower eﬃciency in Table 8 and
for a case of higher eﬃciency in Table 9. As shown in these tables, for low enough eﬃciency
levels the private monopoly case generates higher welfare levels than the public monopoly
case regardless of the level of public investment. In contrast, for high enough eﬃciency
levels it is the public monopoly that generates the higher welfare for most cases.
Table 8. The Eﬀects of Public Investments (b=0.5, B=0.7)
Ψ Ypub/Ypriv Cpub/Cpriv Pinv/GR
0.1 0.937 0.915 0.044
0.2 1.000 0.960 0.088
0.4 1.067 0.989 0.176
0.6 1.108 0.992 0.264
0.8 1.138 0.982 0.353
1 1.163 0.964 0.441
1.2 1.183 0.942 0.529
1.4 1.200 0.917 0.618
1.6 1.215 0.889 0.706
1.8 1.228 0.859 0.794
23Table 9. The Eﬀects of Public Investments (b=0.9, B=0.9)
Ψ Ypub/Ypriv Cpub/Cpriv Pinv/GR
0.1 1.050 1.025 0.044
0.2 1.120 1.076 0.088
0.4 1.196 1.109 0.176
0.6 1.245 1.111 0.264
0.8 1.276 1.100 0.353
1 1.303 1.081 0.441
1.2 1.325 1.056 0.529
1.4 1.345 1.028 0.618
1.6 1.362 0.996 0.706
1.8 1.377 0.962 0.794
Noticeable, in all Tables 7-9 the eﬀect of deﬁcits in the intermediate public monopoly on
the aggregate wealfare gains from privatization is consistently negative. Higher deﬁcits are
associated with higher gains from privatizations for all cases. Even in those cases where the
privatization of SOEs was found to generate a welfare loss, the losses become smaller as the
deﬁcit becomes larger.
Going back to Table 2, we are able to relate this conclusion to the diﬀerent regions of the
world. According to the data presented in Table 2, the average Latin American country is
t h em o s tl i k e l yt oh a v en o n - d e ﬁcitary SOEs (they are the only region with a negative average
for FLOW); whereas the average Asian country is the least likely. Thus, for a common level
of productive and bureaucratic eﬃciencies, our results would suggest that Latin American
countries would beneﬁt less from privatizations than Asian countries would. This conclusion
is subject to the caveat that the eﬃciency levels of public Latin American ﬁrms could be
very diﬀerent from the respective levels of Asian public ﬁrms.
In general, as mentioned in the preceeding sections, the available evidence does not show
24an indication for severe SOEs deﬁcits for any developing region and points only to medium
or low levels of public ineﬃciencies. In such a scenario of low ineﬃciency and low deﬁcits,
the results of our model would predict small (if any) gains from privatization whenever
privatization is not followed by increased competition.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have addressed the issue of how x-ineﬃciency and bureaucratic ineﬃciency
inﬂuence the welfare implications of the privatization of intermediate goods industries. We
have focused on steady state analysis. Issues that might be interesting to pursue in the
future are:
(i) The desirability of any ﬁscal policy reform depends crucially on what is going on
along the entire transition and not only in the steady state. In order to study the welfare
consequences of large scale privatizations it will thus be useful to study the transitional
dynamics of privatization.
(ii) In this paper the output of the industry to be privatized was only an intermediate
good in the production of the ﬁnal consumption good. Most examples mentioned in this
paper such as electricity and phone service also serve as ﬁnal consumption goods. We leave
this generalization to future work.
(iii) The role of the government in this paper has been very simple in that the
government only has two functions, to run the SOEs and to carry out transfers programs.
In this model the cost of using tax revenue to prop up ineﬃcient public sector enterprises
25might be relatively small, since the cost of propping up these enterprises is only lost transfer
payments. The cost of running public sector enterprises with a tax ﬁnanced deﬁcit might be
substantially higher if ﬁnancing these deﬁcits comes at the expense of productive government
expenditures such as infrastructure investments.
(iv) Finally, governments typically have diﬀerent wage compensation schemes than
the private sector. Large scale privatization then might have substantial distributional con-
sequences.
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